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destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
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Abstract: This paper presents the STAMP (system-theoretic accident modeling and processes) accident model, based on systems
theory, and describes its application in the context of risk prevention related to the remediation of contaminated sediments. The
implementation of the model is described, and results are presented both in methodological and technical terms. The goal of this
article is to emphasize the need of new approaches to take into account hazards and accidents within socio-technical systems.
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1. Introduction
Remediation methods for contaminated sediments
are now proved very effective in the treatment and
management of contaminants. These methods use
diverse techniques, and provide appropriate solutions
for the treatment of sediment which originates from a
variety of sources and has various consequences for
the environment and people. However, these
particularly novel and complex treatment technologies
require a comprehensive hazard analysis. The analysis
should aim to characterize all threats and risks
(damage to people, equipment, local residents, the
environment etc.), going beyond simple technical
aspects related to the industrial process. This goal led
to the search for a systems-based accident model,
capable of meeting these criteria. The STAMP
(systems-theoretic accident modeling and processes)
accident model was chosen to characterize the
dangers of an innovative remediation process known
as Novosol®. The analysis was carried out through
the application of the STPA (STamP-based analysis)
Corresponding author: Karim Hardy, research scholar,
research fields: safety engineering, reliability, risk management
within organizations. E-mail: hardykarim@gmail.com.

technique, associated with the STAMP model.
The following text is divided into three parts. The
first describes the problem of contaminated
sediments and their danger to ecosystems and human
health. Given these dangers, conventional treatment
approaches are discussed. This first part also
describes the Novosol® technology, a treatment
process for contaminated sediments. The second part
deals with the STAMP accident model developed at
the MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) by
Professor Nancy Leveson, and the associated STPA
technique, used for safety assessment. The third part
presents the application of the STPA technique to the
Novosol® system and outlines the results obtained.
The aim here is to formulate safety recommendations
focused on the overall socio-technical system in
question.

2. Contaminated Sediments and Novosol®
This section discusses the issue of contaminated
sediments. It is divided into three subsections. The
first describes the environmental and health hazards
arising from contaminated sediments. The second briefly
discusses the treatment options available. The third
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describes the Novosol® process (designed and developed
by Solvay Company), of industrial treatment and
remediation.
2.1 Contaminated Sediments: The Hazards
The natural environment is subject to numerous
sources of contamination. Whether of industrial, urban
or agricultural origin, they contain a rich variety of
sedimentary pollutants. The damage caused by
contaminated sediments has real environmental, social
and economic costs. Not only are they the source of
substantial loss of income due to the decline and
contamination of animal and plant species, but they
are also the cause of health problems for ecosystems
and local populations. Dredging may also be required
because sediments can cause an increased risk of
Table 1

flooding in certain areas, or reduce the draft of some
waterways.
The main contaminants (cadmium, copper,
chromium, lead, zinc, PCBs (polychlorinated
biphenyls), PAHs (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons),
and arsenic) arise from industrial activity (Table 1).
The contamination they cause varies widely from one
sediment to another and the health effects on both
plant and animal populations can be dramatic
(changes in, or destruction of aquatic ecosystems,
development of pathological genes, etc.).
2.2 Contaminated Sediments: Treatment Solutions
The treatment of contaminated sediments poses
significant technological, economic and environmental
challenges. It can reduce pollution levels to the point

Sources of sedimentary contaminants (the sign “●” means “a source of”).

Industrial sector
Steel/iron
Aluminium
Anti-fouling paint
Electrical appliances
Automobile
Batteries
Rubber
Shipyards
Chemical
Leather/tanning
Detergents/surfactants
Water/gas/electricity distribution
Explosives
Extraction of precious minerals
Oxide production
Metal finishing
Steam power
Electroplating
Munitions
Photography
Pigments/inks
Printing plates
Plastics
Metallurgical processes
Oil refining
Diverse sources
Wastewater treatment
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where sediments cleaned in this way can potentially be
reused or recycled. The sediment is analyzed in order to
select the appropriate technology and more importantly,
to estimate the cost (Table 2). The fact that some
processing techniques can themselves have an
environmental impact, due to the release of
contaminated water and/or gas into the natural
environment needs to be taken into account. It must
also be noted that all technical treatments of
contaminated sediments that remove, store or treat
contaminated sediment involve the breakdown and
release of contaminants during the extraction operation.
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operated under license by a company (or local
collective) involved in environmental protection [2].
The process is divided into two treatment stages [3]:
Stage A: phosphation, which stabilizes heavy
metals in the sediment (Fig. 1);
Stage B: calcination, which destroys organic matter
and provides usable products such as bricks or
material for making roads (Fig. 2).

Underwater sediments that are broken down in situ
can cause contaminants to become suspended in the
water column. The treatment solution must ensure that
the level of these contaminants is as low as possible.
2.3 Treatment Solutions: The Novosol® Procedure
In 1993, Solvay SA began the development of
Novosol® [1] initially to deal with fly ash from
incineration then, from 1999, for a range of
contaminated sediments. It responds to a wider need
for the treatment of contaminated sediments and is
Table 2

Fig. 1 Steps A and B of the Novosol® process. The two
steps are complementary and independent, and produce no
waste or liquid effluents. Stage A: heavy metals are
stabilized by capturing them in a calcium phosphate matrix,
Stage B: organic compounds are destroyed by calcination
(650-900 °C = 1,200-1,650 °F) [3].

Treatment techniques for contaminated sediments.

Treatment techniques

Application

Characteristics

Effectiveness

Cost

Pesticides, hydrocarbons,
PCBs, aromatic chlorides

pH 4.5-8.5
Temperature 59-167 °C
Hydration 40%-80%

Depends on the
volume to be treated

Fairly high

Dioxins, PCBs,
chlorobenzene

pH > 2
Temperature 158-302 °C
Hydration < 20%

> 98% effective for
PCBs

High

Solvent extraction

PCBs, volatile organic
compounds, aromatics,
metals

Organic compounds < 40% Around 90% effective
High
Solid portion < 20%
for PCBs

Soil leaching

Heavy metals, aromatics,
PCBs, pesticides

Particle size 0.063-2 mm

Solidification/stabilization

Inorganic compounds, oily
sludge and solvents

Biological treatments

Physicochemical treatments
Dechlorination

90%-99% for volatiles
and 40%-90% for
High
semi-volatiles
Fully effective on
Relatively low
inorganic compounds

Thermal treatments
Calcination
Desorption at low temperature

Volatile and semi-volatile
compounds, dioxins
Volatile and semi-volatile
compounds

Hydration < 50%
Particle size 1-2 mm

More than 99% for
organic compounds

Very high

99%

High
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An example of product re-use in road building [3].

A system like this, which brings together
technology for the treatment of contaminated
sediments and a large number of people on the ground,
creates a high level of activity and risk, which must be
controlled. Control is achieved through the application
of the STPA risk analysis technique, which is
associated with the systems-based accident model
STAMP. STAMP facilitates a global risk analysis of
the socio-technical system [4].

follow certain rules and principles and which, over
time, control the system state. Seen from a system
safety perspective, the challenge is to always keep in
mind that in such a dynamic system, a stable dynamic
system state can become an unstable dynamic state.
Modern technologies have a significant impact on the
very nature of accidents and risks. In order to
understand them, new explanatory mechanisms must
be established. At the same time new techniques for
risk assessment must be developed to prevent
accidents occurring [4].
Systems-based accident models enable a better
description and understanding of the links between
diverse factors across different hierarchical levels.
They thus facilitate the study of problems in a way
which makes it possible to have a global view of the
socio-technical

system.

Systems-based

accident

models are distinguished from other models in that
they describe the process of an accident as a set of
interconnected and complex events, while sequential
models [5] and organizational models [6] simply

3. The STAMP Model and the STPA
Technique

present a linear description of the accident. In

The accident model described in this section is a

come together in a specific place and time [7].
Models based on systems theory view accidents as
emergent phenomena which are the result of
interactions between components of a system.
Interactions between these components are nonlinear
and consist of many feedback loops [8]. In effect,
safety is only established by interactions between
elements of a system and does not constitute the
property of an individual element. Systems models
derive from general systems theory [9] which
proposes principles, models and laws in order to
understand relationships between the elements of a
complex system. From this perspective, a system is
not seen as a static representation, but rather as a
dynamic process, constantly adapting in order to
achieve its objectives and responding to internal and
external changes.

systems-based model. It was developed in the 2000s
by Professor Nancy Leveson at the Complex System
Research Laboratory of the MIT (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology), and addresses the limitations
of traditional accident models. This section is divided
into three subsections. The first highlights the value of
systems-based accident models in general. The second
describes the STAMP model in particular. The third
describes the STPA technique which has been
developed from the STAMP model.
3.1 Systems-Based Accident Models
Any complex system has its own dynamics which
have evolved during its lifetime, and are the results of
the activities that link its elements. This dynamic is
subject to the interplay of various factors, which

systems-based models, an accident occurs when
several factors (human, technical, environmental)
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Systems-based accident models therefore aim to
study the dynamic, nonlinear properties of the system
and the migration of an organization under stress into
a dangerous or even accidental state. The proactive
nature of these accident models (in terms of risk
prevention) means that they can address problems that
affect the system as a whole, rather than focusing on
specific problems associated with isolated errors,
taken out of context. This type of model can also take
into account dynamic aspects by modeling this
migration within organizations that are subject to
various global and environmental pressures related to
their activities and/or issues.
3.2 The STAMP Model
The STAMP accident model is based on systems
and control theory [4]. It was developed by Professor
Nancy Leveson (MIT). In the STAMP model, safety
is viewed as a control problem. The STAMP model is
constructed from three interrelated concepts (safety
constraints, hierarchical control structures and process
models), described below:
 Safety constraints: The concept of constraint is at
the heart of the STAMP model. In systems theory,
control always calls for the integration of constraints.
An accident is not seen as the result of a series of
events, but as a deficiency or lack of integration of
constraints at each level of the socio-technical system.
Safety constraints target the relationships and
decisions between the many and various system
variables. These constraints are also associated with a
control process which aims to manage changes and
adaptations in system behavior. Unlike the classical
vision of the accident (that it is due to a sequence of
events) in STAMP terms, accidents are viewed as the
inadequate enforcement of constraints within a
socio-technical system;
 Hierarchical safety control structures: Accident
prevention or analysis requires the design of a
control structure that includes a description of the
socio-technical system which is as representative as
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possible of a given context. This structure takes into
account constraints required during both the
development of the system, and its subsequent
operation in accordance with functional requirements.
A control structure can be developed for each
subsystem of a larger system. Systems theory
understands a system as a hierarchical structure in
which each level imposes constraints on the
activity of the level below it [4, 10]. Accidents result
from the inadequate enforcement of constraints
within the hierarchical levels of a given
socio-technical system;
 Process models and control loops: A control
process (within a process model) operates between
each level of the hierarchy described above. The
purpose of the control process is to translate an
“input” from one hierarchical level into a “control”
over another hierarchical level. This control process
can operate both upwards and downwards though the
hierarchy. It is represented diagrammatically as a
control loop which describes the control process. In
complex systems, one or more control loops link the
hierarchical levels of each control structure, with a
downlink channel providing the information and
controls necessary to impose constraints on the lower
level, and an uplink channel which feeds back the
effectiveness of these constraints. At each level of the
control structure, inadequate control may result from
neglect of safety constraints, poor communication of
safety constraints or safety constraints incorrectly
applied at the lower level. This is why feedback
represents such an important dimension in the
operation of a system. For example, the constraints
generated by the safety analysis process always
include assumptions about the operating environment
of the process. When the environment changes, these
assumptions become false, and the controls in place
are no longer appropriate. This discrepancy between
the environment and the system can become the cause
of a de-synchronization and the source of
inappropriate or even dangerous behavior.
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The effective implementation and operation of the
STAMP model is achieved through a technology
known as STPA, presented in the next section.
3.3 The STPA Technique
STPA is a systems safety technique developed from
the STAMP accident model [11]. STPA hazard
analysis (STamP-based Analysis) was described by
Leveson and her team [4-12]. The analysis has two
main objectives: accident investigation and safety
assessment. STPA hazard analysis is an iterative
process which facilitates analysis of the origins and
causes of an accident. In STPA analysis, the system is
seen as a set of control loops which interact with each
other. An accident is therefore the result of an
inadequate control.
STPA analysis can be used for both accident
prevention and to evaluate the safety level of a system.
In the latter case, the aim is to collect information that
drives a safety-oriented approach to design and
development. Hazard analysis is essentially a
procedure which aims to prevent accidents before they
happen. A proactive approach to accident prevention,
based on the STAMP model, may provide the
information necessary for risk prevention and thus the
occurrence of accidents.
Current hazard analysis techniques, such as those
found in operational safety, are not equipped to take
into consideration the dynamic and complex nature of
modern systems, in which human-machine
interactions are important. That said, the objectives of
an STPA hazard analysis are broadly similar to those
of a traditional hazards analysis.
On the one hand, it aims to identify hazards
throughout the life-cycle of a system as well as safety
constraints associated with the maintenance of an
acceptable level of safety;
On the other hand, it aims to determine how safety
constraints may be violated and how such constraints
can lead to inappropriate actions which push the
system toward an accidental state.

The STPA hazard analysis process is divided into
five stages (Fig. 3):
Stage 1: consists of a preliminary analysis of
system risk, and in the definition of requirements and
constraints applicable at the level of the system, in
order to define safety requirements and constraints to
be applied to the system as a whole.
Stage 2: consists of the establishment of the safety
control structure (the roles and responsibilities of the
elements and feedback mechanisms). It allows the
establishment of the safety control structure for the
system, which include the roles and responsibilities of
each element, both control elements and feedback.
This stage will ultimately define and establish the
control structure for system safety as described by
Leveson [10]. Every level or element of the control
structure has roles and responsibilities that help
determine whether system safety constraints are
applied or not. Once the system elements to be
included have been defined, the safety control structure
must be modeled.
Stage 3: aims to integrate system requirements and
constraints for each element of the system. The system
requirements and constraints defined in Stage 1 must
be integrated for each element of the safety control
structure defined in Stage 2.
Stage 4: involves a detailed analysis of the control
structure and process models in order to identify
inadequate controls actions which may play a role in
the occurrence of an accident. In order to do this,
inadequate controls actions are classified into four
types [1]:
 A control action was not executed;
 An inappropriate or ineffective control action
was executed leading to a failure;
 A potentially correct control action took place
too early, too late, or at the wrong time;
 A correct control action was stopped too early.
Stage 5: is a temporal (immediate, long-term,
standard) categorization of identified risks (defects in
control loops). This categorization is done primarily to

Hazard Mitigation through a Systemic Model of Accident to a Socio-Technical System: A Case Study
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directly affected by the numerous participants
involved in the procedure. Implementation of the
Novosol® program requires the development of a
Nosovol® facility. In this example, the facility is
managed by Company A, who are in direct contact
with Company B. Company B is in charge of the
operation of the Novosol® process.
This section is organized into five subsections
which illustrate each of the five stages of the
application of the STPA technique to the Novosol®
program.
4.1 Stage 1: Preliminary Risk Analysis and Definition
of Requirements and Constraints at System Level

Fig. 3 The STPA process in safety assessment, adapted
from Leveson et al. (2004).

determine the impact of inadequate control actions on
system behavior. Control defects are then dealt with
by identifying the processes that could lead to a
breach of one or more safety constraints.
These five stages together form the STPA
methodology which is the backdrop for the
implementation of the STAMP model in an industrial
setting. The remediation of contaminated sediment
(carried out using a physicochemical process called
Novosol®) was selected as the field of analysis to
make the demonstration. The whole application is
described in the next section.

4. Applying the STPA Technique to the
Novosol® Program
In this section, each stage of the STPA
methodology presented above is revisited and
described in the context of Novosol® as a
socio-technical system [1]. The level of complexity is

During a safety assessment, a preliminary risk and
hazards analysis is performed at system level, in order
to define the safety requirements and constraints to be
integrated. It must be carried out in the early stages of
the life-cycle of the socio-technical system. This
preliminary system risk analysis, when applied to the
Novosol® system, consists of two levels of analysis.
The first concerns the technical implementation of the
Novosol® process, while the second focuses on the
socio-technical aspect of the system, and includes all
actors in the system and their interactions. This
approach meets the requirements of the Solvay SA
group, and the methodology of the STPA hazard
analysis technique.
An initial investigation was undertaken in response
to a request from industry for a risk management
analysis of the Novosol® system. The request
concerns risk assessment of the phosphation phase of
the technical process.
An occupational risk assessment was carried out
using compliance and risk analysis software
(http://www.preventeo.com) followed by a HAZOP1
analysis. It was apparent that the HAZOP
methodology is suited to the analysis of the
physicochemical aspects of the Novosol® procedure
1

HAZOP [3] is a technique for hazard analysis which aims to
identify deviations in a system or process, often physical and/or
chemical.
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[11], and also underlined the fact that, like the STPA
technique, HAZOP methodology looks for potential
differences between the desired state of the system
and its actual condition. However, while HAZOP
focuses on technical parameters in a technical system,
STPA deals with control problems in a socio-technical
system, taking into account human and organizational
factors. The HAZOP-based analysis was used to
characterize the initial safety constraints of the
phosphation phase of the Novosol procedure, which
are focused on process engineering.
This set of analyses 2 led to the formulation of
safety recommendations to improve both the design of
a future Novosol® installation and safety levels in
preparation for becoming fully operational. They were
supplemented by a second study and subject to a more
comprehensive analysis. This second study focused on
Novosol® as a socio-technical system. It included both
human and organizational factors at the site, as well as
the companies involved in the evolution of Novosol®,
in terms of its development and operation.
System requirements and constraints are defined for
each hierarchical level of the system. In this way, for
the company operating the Novosol® process (Solvay
SA during the technological development phase) and
in the current context, requirements and constraints
can be identified, using the STPA method. They are
shown in Table 3.
Taken together, the definitions of requirements and
constraints for each of the hierarchical levels enable
the hierarchical control structure to be established.
4.2 Stage 2: Establishment of the Safety Control Structure
This second stage allows the construction of the
safety control structure of the system in question,
including the roles and responsibilities of each element
(control elements and their feedback loops) [13, 14].
The definition and establishment of the system
safety control structure [10] is the cornerstone of this
2

Reports containing the results of this work were delivered to
Solvay SA in 2009.

STPA stage, each level or element of the control
structure has roles and responsibilities that aimed at
ensuring system safety constraints are applied within
the system. Once the safety control structure has been
defined, it is necessary to model it.
The model is built by linking the various
hierarchical levels using the interactions between
elements. This stage includes all the actors defined in
Stage 1, when the requirements and constraints of the
Novosol® system were established.
This stage not only provides an overview of the
system in question, but also highlights the
interactions between levels in the hierarchy. The
control structure integrates roles and responsibilities.
This makes it easier to determine the influence
elements have on each other (Fig. 4). The structure
provides a static overview of the whole Novosol®
system, showing the roles and responsibilities at each
hierarchical level. These roles and responsibilities
are used to support the definition and integration of
constraints (identified in Stage 3) at the level of each
actor in the structure.
The purpose of the structure thus defined is to
represent the interactions between different
hierarchical levels, and to characterize the controls
between elements. It sets limits for the analysis that
will subsequently determine potentially inadequate
controls between levels.
4.3 Stage 3: Integration of System Requirements and
Constraints at the Level of the Element
The system requirements and constraints defined in
Stage 1 must be integrated into each hierarchical level of
the safety control structure defined in Stage 2. This third
stage is based on the previous two, and aims to integrate
safety requirements and constraints within each
hierarchical level. This is done taking into account the
various interactions between elements. This stage allows
the definition of requirements which are translated into
safety constraints, given the various interactions
between elements of the safety control structure.

Hazard Mitigation through a Systemic Model of Accident to a Socio-Technical System: A Case Study
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Sample requirements and constraint definitions for the controller (the operating company).

Company operating Novosol® (Company B)
Safety constraints and requirements
Treatment of sediments contaminated by organic compounds and heavy metals
Responsible for the smooth conduct of inspections and preparation of reports on the use and development of Novosol® in collaboration
with national and international bodies
Responsible for defining operational requirements and performance of Novosol® in accordance with national and international
regulations

Fig. 4

Structure of the Novosol® system following analysis using the STPA technique.

From Fig. 4, the higher hierarchical level—for
example the decision-making level of the company
responsible for the development of Novosol ®
(Company A)—sets developmental requirements for
the lower hierarchical level (the industrial
development of Novosol®). This lower level must
provide feedback (control checks) through the
submission of development reports to the higher level
(the decision-making level of Company A). This is the
case for each interaction and each variable.
In practical terms (at this level of the structure), the
decision-making level of Company A must define and
provide requirements for the development of a
Novosol® facility to the service or entity responsible
for industrial development. In return, and in order that

management of Company A is informed of the
successful integration of these developmental
requirements (controls), the service or entity provides
development reports describing the progress of the
project, including any potential difficulties.
Specifically, for the two hierarchical levels “the
decision-making level of the company responsible for
the development of Novosol®” and “the industrial
development Novosol®”, the wording might be: “The
decision-making level of the company in charge of the
development of Novosol® (Company A) must provide
developmental requirements to the level responsible
for the industrial development of Novosol® (Company
A)”. In return, “the level responsible for the industrial
development of Novosol® (Company A) must provide
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reports indicating the progress of development to the
decision-making level of the company responsible for
the overall development of Novosol® (Company A)”.
4.4 Stage 4: Detailed Examination and Analysis of the
Control Structure and Process Models for Inadequate
Controls
In this stage, a detailed analysis of inadequate
controls is required. The analysis helps to identify
potentially inadequate controls which may lead to an
accident. The analysis is based on identification of the
four types of inadequate controls described in Stage 4
of the STPA methodology (see Section 3.3). This
analysis leads to the definition of actual inadequate
control measures (or potential in the case of a safety
assessment). For each hierarchical level, inadequate
controls are defined using the relationships established
when the control structure was constructed (Table 4).
Collectively, inadequate control measures are
translated into constraints and safety requirements
which have to be integrated at the level of each system
element (Table 5).
This translation of potential inadequate and
defective controls forms an inventory of defects and
dangers that could lead the system towards an
accidental state. This list allows the definition of the
constraints that each hierarchical level must respect in
order to maintain an acceptable level of safety. These
inadequate control actions and constraints are termed
“potential” because they are assumed to exist and are
only defined in the context of a safety assessment.
4.5 Stage 5: Categorization of Identified Risks
The first step is to categorize the risks identified in
Table 4

order to determine the impact of inadequate control
actions on the behavior of the system. The second step
is to implement a risk management strategy through
the identification of the process(es) leading to the
breach of one or more safety constraints. This step
aims to create a hierarchy of control defects. It aims to
optimize system safety by first, quickly addressing
immediate risks that might migrate the system to an
accidental state, then addressing long-term risks
(which could lead to an accident at some point in the
future), then finally tackling “standard” risks which
are dealt with using a risk management strategy during
the life-cycle of the system.
The challenge here is to identify which safety
recommendations need to be implemented as a
priority. The identification made it necessary to
identify in a control loop, a safety constraint may be
violated. At each level of the loop, and in each
interaction between loop levels, there may be
inadequate controls. The goal is, for each hierarchical
level, to identify inadequate controls that can migrate
the system to an accidental state. During execution of
the loop each of these controls may result in the
creation of an inadequate output control at another
level, resulting in the migration of the system (Fig. 5)
into an unstable state.
Fig. 6 illustrates the “maintenance” level. This
description of the control loop is simplified, i.e.,
potentially inadequate controls within it are not
included.
The “maintenance” control loop, highlighting the
collection of elements involved in the control process
at this level, in interaction with the levels “industrial
development” and “design”. Based on Fig. 5, this control

Inadequate control actions for the controller (the company operating Novosol®).

Company operating Novosol® (Company A)
(Potential) inadequate control measures
The decision-making level of the operating company does not provide operating requirements for the safe use of Novosol® to the
operational level
The decision-making level of the operating company does not make their developmental requirements known to the decision-making
level of the company responsible for the development of Novosol® (Company A)
The decision-making level of the operating company does not provide inspection reports to control bodies

Hazard Mitigation through a Systemic Model of Accident to a Socio-Technical System: A Case Study
Table 5
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Potential constraints on the controller (the company operating Novosol®).

Company operating Novosol® (Company A)
(Potential) constraints
The decision-making level of the operating company must provide operating requirements for the safe use of Novosol® to the
operational level
The decision-making level of the operating company must make their developmental requirements known to the decision-making
level of the company responsible for the development of Novosol® (Company A)
The decision-making level of the operating company must provide inspection reports to control bodies

Fig. 5 Inadequate control loop. Actions carried out within the control loop may lead to an inadequate control. These
potential actions must be identified so that the hierarchical level can provide adequate control.

Fig. 6

The “maintenance” control loop [1].

loop may contain incorrect information that could
cause an inadequate control output to the “design” and
“industrial development” levels.
This and all other loops in the control structure are

part of the Novosol® system and it is therefore
essential to analyze them from the point of view of the
entire system in order to determine the potential
source of inappropriate controls (Fig. 7).
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Subsystem

Fig. 7 Description of a control loop within the control structure of Novosol® [1]. Integration of the control loop into the
control structure illustrates how a given hierarchical level interacts with the rest of the control structure.

greatly to so-called traditional model of accidents. The

chemicals and plastics;
 ANRT (National Association of Technological
Research), for providing a grant to carry out this work.
ANRT is a French research and development
non-profit organization (including both public and
private sector businesses) which aims to optimize
innovation and research in France;
 The MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
and especially Nancy Leveson (Complex Systems
Research Laboratory), for hosting me for six months
in order to conduct research on the STAMP model.
The Complex Systems Research Laboratory is headed
by Professor Nancy Leveson who is responsible for
developing the STAMP Model.

study of system risk at an organizational level, rather
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